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11. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from an order denying Appellant Shey Schoger's petition for postconviction relief pursuailt to a state's motion for summary dismissal. Clerk's Record (CR) 60,
62.

B. Procedural Historv and Statement of Facts
On May 11,2004, Shey Schoger was charged by indictment with trafficking in
methamphetamine (400 grams or more), possession of a controlled substance (marijuana) with
intent to deliver, and possession of a co~ltrolledsubstance (psilocybin andlor psilocyn) with
intent to deliver. CR 49
On October 7,2004, the parties reached a plea agreement wherein Ms. Schoger would
enter a guilty plea to trafficking in methamphetamine (200 grams or more) and the state would
recommend a fixed sentence no greater than the five-year mandatory minimum, with an
unspecified indetem~inateterm to follow, and the imposition of a $15,000 mandatory minimum
fine. CR 50

A plea hearing was held. The District Court began by explaining its understanding of the
agreement, explaining penalties and rights waived, and determining that Ms. Schoger was not
under the influence of drugs or alcohol, had discussed the case with her attorney and various
other standard preliminary matters. Tr. 1017104 p. 106-1 11 at CR 23-23A. The Court then
stated:
Well, Ms. Schoger, based upon what you've told me, then, I find you understand
the charge. I find that you understand the potential consequences of your decision
to plead guilty. I find that your plea of guilty is a voluntary decision. And finally,

that you committed the crime of trafficking in methamphetamine in a quantity
greater than 200 grams.
Tr. 10i7104 p. 111 at CR 23A.
The Court then stated that it wished to ask a couple of follow up questions beginning with
the question of how Ms. Schoger possessed the methamphetamine. Ms. Schoger told the Court
that she had 56 granis on her person and possessed other methamphetamine in a bedroom at a
house. Tr. 1017104 p. 111-112 at CR 23A.
The Court asked if Ms. Schoger had the intention to "exercise control over [the
methamphetamine] in some fashion,.to move it around or do something with it at a later time."
Tr. 1017104 p. 112 at CR 23A.
Ms. Schoger discussed this questioil with counsel and counsel stated that Mr. Davis was
the primary person who handled the methamphetamine and that it was basically hidden from her,
hut that she lived in the house and strongly believed that the state could prove constructive
possession if the case went to trial. Counsel stated, "And so with regard to the quantity that is
within the house, Ms. Schoger admits to constructively possessing that and would ask the court
to continue to proceed forward with her plea in terms of the 200 grams or more." Tr. 1017104 p.
112-113 at CR 23A and 24.

The Court then told counsel that it was asking the questions of Ms. Schoger and that it
was concerned about apparent reticence on her part. The following transpired:
Court: So you can just tell me right now, did you know it was there or did you
only possess 56 grams that you told me about at first?
Ms. Schoger: Yes. Yes. It was in the house and Court: And you knew about it?

Ms. Schoger: I didn't know, I didn't know that much, but I knew there was some
in there.
Court: Did you have the intention to exercise control over it?
Ms. Schoger: No
Court: Okay. May I have a list of the state's witnesses?
Tr. p. 114 at CR 24.
Defense counsel then immediately asked the court to take the plea as an Alford plea.' The
Court responded:
The short answer is no, and I'll tell you why, Mr. Barnum
By this plea of guilty, she gives up her right to appeal the decision on the
suppression hearing.
What she has just told me here is a defense, is a factual innocence assertion as to
the charge. It's one thing to enter an Alford plea under true Alford circumstances,
which was, 'I don't recall,' whether it be a function of mental illness, whether it
be a function of voluntary consumption of alcohol, or other items. But an Alford
plea, in my view, is not an appropriate mechanism for a defendant to say, 'I didn't
commit the crime, but I wish to avail myself of a plea offer in this case.'
The reason we have jury trials is to assess guilt or innocence, and this is precisely
a case where I think it would be an abuse of my- responsibilities to afford the
defendant her constitutional right to have a guilt or innocence determination rather
than extracting a plea of guilty under the threat of increased consequences.
A

She's told me that she did not commit the crime to which she would have pled
under the information.
Tr. 1017104 p. 115 at CR 24.
A trial followed at which Ms. Schoger was found guilty of trafficking in

methamphetamine (400 grams or more) and the lesser included misdemeanor charge of

' North Carolina v. AIford, 400 U.S. 25,91 S. Ct.160 (1970).
3

possession of a controlled substance (psilocybin andlor psilcyn). She was sentenced to 15 years,
a mandatory minimum term of 10 years followed by an indeterminate term of five years. She
was also fined the mandatory amount of $25,000. CR 50-51.
Ms. Schoger filed an appeal wherein the suppression issue the District Court was
concerned about was not raised. The only issue raised was that her sentence was excessive,
notwithstanding that the Court was required by statute to impose the ten-year m a n d a t o ~
minimuin term. The Court of Appeals denied relief in a single page unpublished per curiam
decision. State v. Schoger, 2006 Unpublished Opinion No. 399, CR 3
Ms. Schoger thereafter filed apro se petition for post-conviction relief raising the issue of
ineffective assistance of counsel insofar as counsel did not explain to her the elements of the
charge to which she would be pleading thus leading her to be confused during the plea hearing
and ultimately leading the Court to refuse her plea. In particular, in her affidavit, Ms. Schoger
stated:

. . . The judge was informed that an agreement had been reached on a plea
bargain. Judge Horton asked me if I was ready to enter a plea of guilty and I had
stated that yes I was. Judge Horton then asked me a series of questions that I was
not expecting. When he asked me if I was in possession of 200 grams but no
more than 400 grams I looked at my attorney in confusion because I was unsure of
the answer. I then stated no. The judge then asked me what I was in possession
of and I told him 52 grams. After a lot of confusion and me looking at my
attorney for some sort of answers, Judge Horton wouldn't let me enter a plea of
guilty and said that this case was proceeding to trial. After Judge Horton recessed
I looked at my attorney and had asked him what went wrong and why did I have to
go to trial. He stated that it was because I didn't say that I was in possession of
200 grams or not more than 400 grams. I looked at him and said I wasn't in
possession of that. I told the judge what I was in possession of. I was very
confused and upset because I didn't understand what was happening. Mr. Bamum
then explained to me the word possession. He said that what you know is
considered the same as what is actually on your person. You do not necessarily
have to have it in your possession. I looked at him and asked why none of this

had been explained to me. I had never experienced such serious charges with so
much different details in it. Going through this, I relied on my attorney and put
my trnst and confidence in his ability that he would make sure that I knew what
was happening. I strongly feel that if I had been explained the process of entering
a plea and what would be expected to be aslted by the judge that I would be
serving a sentence that had heen offered by the state and would not have had to
proceed to trial and received the sentence of a minimandatory of 10 years.
CR 8-9.
Counsel was appointed and an amended petition was filed. The amended petition raised
three claims for relief: 1) that trial counsel was ineffective in explaining the elements of the
charge to Ms. Schoger resulting in the court's rejection of her guilty plea; 2) that the District
Court abused its discretion in rejecting the guilty plea either on the facts as tendered or as an
Alfovd plea; and 3) that appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to raise the issue of whether

the District Court erred in rejecting the plea on direct appeal. CR 17.
The state filed a response and motion to dismiss. CR 38. A hearing and briefing
followed. CR 44, Augmented Record Brief ill Support of Motion for Summary Dismissal, filed
12/6/06; State's Second Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Dismissal, filed 12122106;
Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to Summary Disposition, filed 1/5/07,
Following the hearing, the District Court entered a memorandum opinion and a
subsequent order dismissing the petition. CR 49, 60.

In the memorandum opinion, the Court stated that trial counsel had provided
constitutionally deficient assistance when he failed to explain to his client the elements of the
offense to which she was going to plead guilty. CR 54-55. However, the Court concluded that
there was not prejudice because the only way the Court would have accepted the plea would have
been if Ms Schoger had lied about her intent to control the methamphetamine. CR 56.

The Court also rejected the claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failing
to raise the issue that the District Court erred in refusing to accept an Alford plea stating that
given the language of A@rd and the lack of any authority in support of the position that a court
can abuse its discretion by refusing to accept a plea, Ms. Schoger would not have prevailed on
appeal. CR 58-59.
The memorandum opinion did not directly address the claim that the District Court had
abused its discretion in refusing to accept an A@rd plea, although by determining that Ms.
Schoger would not have prevailed on appeal on such a claim, the Court implicitly rejected the
more direct claim that the Court had abused its discretion. CR 49.

111. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
A. Was dismissal of the claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel improper given
that there was a genuine question of material fact as to whether counsel's failure to advise his
client of the elements of the charge was prejudicial?

B. Was dismissal of the claim that the District Court erred in refusing to accept the guilty
plea improperly dismissed given that there is a right to plead guilty in Idaho?
C. Was the dismissal of the claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel improper
given that there was a genuine question of material fact as to whether the failure of appellate
counsel to raise issues related to the improper refusal of the guilty plea was prejudicial?

IV. ARGUMENT
A. Summary Dismissal was Inaoorooriate Because There was a Genuine
Issue of Material Pact as to Whether Trial Counsel's Ineffective Assistance
Resulted in Prejudice to Ms. Schozer
1 . Standard of Review

An application for post-conviction relief is civil in nature. Workman v. State, 144 Idaho
518, 522, 164 P.3d 798, 802 (2007). Like a civil plaintiff, the applicant for post-conviction relief
must eventually prove by a preponderance of evidence the allegations upon which the claiin
depends. Id. However, summary disposition is appropriate only if the applicant's evidence
raises no genuine issue of material fact. I. C. § 19-4906(b)-(c). On review of a summary
dismissal of a petition, the appellate court will determine whether a genuine issue of fact exists
based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions along with any affidavits on file and will
liberally construe the facts and reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. GilpinGrubb v. State, 138 Idaho 76,80,' 57 P.3d 797, 791 (2002), Workman v. State, supra. When the
alleged facts, even if true would not entitle the applicant to relief, the trial court may dismiss the
application without holding an evidentiary hearing. Workman v. State, supra, citing Stuart v.
State, 118 Idaho 865,869, 801 P.2d 1216, 1220 (1990). Allegations contained in the application
are insufficient for granting of relief when (1) they are clearly disproved by the record of the
original proceedings, or (2) do not justify relief as a matter of law. Workman v. State, supra.

2. Summary Dismissal of the Claim of Ineffective Assistance of Trial
Counsel was Inappropriate
As the District Court stated in its memorandum opinion, a claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel may be properly brought in a post-conviction proceeding and the relevant rules are set

out in State v. Matthews, 133 Idaho 300,986 P.2d 323 (1999):
The benchmark for judging a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is
'whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the
adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just
result." The test for evaluating whether a criminal defendant has received the
effective assistance of counsel is the two prong test found in Strickland [v.
Washington, 426 U.S. 668,687, 104 S. Ct. 2052,2064 (1984)l. Under this test, a
petitioner must show both that: 1) his counsel's conduct was deficient because it
fell outside the wide range of professional norms, and 2) the petitioner was
prejudiced as a result of that deficient conduct.

Also, as found by the District Court, there was deficient performance by counsel. As
stated by the District Court:
A failure to advise a defendant of the elements of an offense to which he or she
subsequently pleads guilty is an omission that does not fall within the wide range
of professionally competent assistance, i.e., it is deficient performance. The
determination whether this duty has been breached does not turn on whether the
effort to plead guilty was successful. Accordingly, for purposes of the present
motion, the Court concludes that Petitioner has adequately alleged deficient
performance of trial counsel.

Where the District Court erred was in its conclusion that there was no genuine issue of
material fact as to whether this deficient performance resulted in prejudice to Ms. Schoger. The
District Court's analysis was:
The 'prejudice' in this case was the Court's refusal to accept Petitioner's proffered
plea of guilty. The only manner in which Petitioner's trial counsel could have
changed the outcome would have been by persuading Petitioner to falsely testify
as to the factual basis upon which the plea of guilty might have been accepted.

This analysis is incorrect.

In the Court's questioning of Ms. Schoger regarding the question of possession, the Court
asked her, "Did you have the intention to exercise control over that [methamphetamine] in some
fashion, to move it around or do something with it at a late? time?" Tr. 1017104 p. 112 at CR
23A (emphasis added). The Court's second question was "Did you have the intention to exercise
control over it?" Tr. 1017104 p. 114 at CR 24. Both of these questions could have logically been
heard by Ms. Schoger to refer to her future intent with regard to the methamphetamine, not her
past behavior. Yet, she could clearly have still been guilty of constructive possession in the past
even if she had resolved to no longer do anything with the methamphetamine at a later time.
Had she been properly informed of the nature of constructive possession by counsel, she
would have understood that guilt of constructive possession does not just extend to intentions as
to the future, but also extends to acts and intentions in the past and she may well have answered
the Court's questions differently and the Court would have then accepted her plea. This
conclusion is supported by Mr. Bamum's comments to the Court wherein he stated:
Judge, with regard to the methamphetamine that was in the house, primarily Mr.
Davis was the person that was handling that methamphetamine. Ms. Schoger
indicates that he would basically keep it hidden from Ms. Schoger. However, that
she did reside in the residence and we strongly believe that the state is going to be
able to prove constructive possession if this matter does proceed to trial.
And so with regard to the quantity that is within the house, Ms. Schoger admits to
constructively possessing that and would ask the court to continue to proceed
forward with her plea in terms of the 200 grams or more.
Tr. 1017104 p. 112-113 at CR 23A-24.
By stating that Mr. Davis primarily handled the methamphetamine, counsel was
indicating that Ms. Schoger also had, at times, access to the drug. Otherwise, counsel would
have stated that Mr. Davis exclusively handled the methamphetamine. And, by stating that the

state could prove constructive possession and that Ms. Schoger was admitting to constructive
possession, counsel was stating that there was a factual basis for the plea and that his client
agreed to that factual basis.
Had Ms. Schoger been properly instructed in the finer points of constructive possession,
she would have given different answers to the Court's questions. Had she given different
answers, her plea would have been accepted and she would have been subjected to a five-year
and $15,000 mandatory minimum sentence rather than the ten-year and $25,000 mandatory
minimum.

Contrary to the Court's analysis, it was not necessary for counsel to instruct Ms.

Schoger to lie to the Court in order to have her plea accepted. Defense counsel and tire state both
believed that there was a factual basis for the plea. (The jury eventually unanimously agreed
beyond a reasonable doubt.) Defense counsel, having conferred with his client, believed that she
was admitting to constructive possession. The hitch in the proceedings came, not because Ms.
Schoger had or made a valid claim of actual innocence. Rather, the hitch came because she did
not understand the intricacies of constructive possession. That, combined with the Court's
questions phrased in the future tense, led to a misunderstanding by the Court as to what Ms.
Schoger was admitting. Had Ms. Schoger's counsel been effective, the misunderstanding would
not have occurred and her plea would have been accepted.
Further, had the plea been accepted, there exists a reasonable probability that Ms. Schoger
would not have been sentenced to a ten-year fixed term. At the sentencing hearing, the state
recommended that the court only impose the mandatory minimum sentence of ten years fixed
with an additional 10 years for a total of twenty years. Of course, had the guilty plea to the
reduced charge been accepted, the state would have recommended that the five-year mandatory

minimum be imposed as part of the negotiated settlement between the parties. In addition, the
state would have recommended that only the $1 5,000 mandatory minimum fine be imposed,
instead of the $25,000 mandatory lnil~imumfine which was eventually imposed.

T #30407

(Attempted Change of Plea), pg. 95, in. 15-23. And, it is highly probable that the sentencing
judge would have followed the state's recommendations, especially since Ms. Schoger had no
prior felony convictions. (While she had four misdemeanor convictions, two of them were for
driver's license violations and the other two (a D.U.1 in 1999 and a Domestic AssaultiBattery in
1996) were not the types of offenses which would lead a judge to impose Inore than the
recommended five year sentence.)
Because there remained a genuine question of material fact, the question of whether trial
counsel's ineffective assistance resulted in prejudice to Ms. Schoger, the District Court erred in
summarily dismissing her petition for post conviction relief.

B. Summary Dismissal Was Inappropriate Because the District Court
Abused Its Discretion in Refusine to Acceat Ms. Schoger's Guilty Plea
1. Standard of Review
The question of whether the District Court has discretion to refuse a knowing, voluntary,
and intelligent guilty plea is a question of law over which this Court exercises free review. State

v. Yzaguivre, 144 Idaho 471,473, 163 P.3d 1183, 1186 (2007).
2. The District Court did not have Discretion to Refuse Ms. Schoger's Plea

The District Court refused to accept Ms. Schoger's guilty plea as an Alfovd plea. This
was an abuse of discretion because the Idaho Criminal Rules create a right to enter a guilty plea.
Summary dismissal of the petition for post-conviction relief was improper in light of this abuse

of discretion.
North Carolina v. Alford, supra, established that express admission of guilt is not

constitutionally required for a valid guilty plea. A guilty plea supported by a factual basis may be
accepted even when accompanied by the defendant's claim of innocence. Alfbrd did not,
however, hold that all constitutionally valid pleas must be accepted by trial courts
A criminal defendant does not have an absolute right under the Constitution to
have his guilty plea accepted by the court, see Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S.
[705] at 719, 82 S. Ct. [I0631 at 1072, 8 L.Ed.2d 21 1 (by implication), although
the States may by slatue or otherwise confer such a right. Likewise, the State may
bar their courts from accepting guilty pleas from any defendants who assert their
innocence. C j Fed.Rule Criin.Proc. 11, which gives a trial judge discretion to
'refuse to accept a plea of guilty * * *.' We need not delineate the scope of that
discretion.

400U.S. at 38, n. 11,91 S. Ct. at 168, n. 11
Since Alford, some state courts have found that state constitutions, statutes, and rules
create a right to plead guilty. See, State v. Martin, 614 P.2d 164, 166 (Wash. 1980); Graham v.
Commonwealth, 397 S.E.2d 270, 272 (Va. App. 1990); State v. Peplow, 36 P.3d 922, 931 (Mont.

2001). Likewise, the Ninth Circuit has determined that "a court must accept an uilconditional
guilty plea, so long as the Rule 1l(b) requirements are met." In re Vasquez-Ramirez, 443 F.3d
692,695-696 (91hCir. 2006).
The Washington Supreme Court recognized a right to plead guilty based upon court rule
and statute. The determinative language of the court rule, CrR 4.2(a) was language that
described the types of pleas that could he entered. "A defendant may plead not guilty, not guilty
by reason of insanity or guilty." The statutory language provided that in answer to the
arraignment, the defendant "may move to set aside the indictment or information, or may demur

or plead to i t . . ."Revised Code of Washington 10.40.060. 614 P.2d at 165-166. The
Washington Court concluded that "[a]lthough the State appears to argue to the contrary, we have
been informed of no statute or rule of court which grants a trial court authority to decline a plea
of guilty made competently, knowingly, voluntarily, unconditionally, unequivocally and on
advice of counsel." 614 P.3d at 166. See also, State v. Ford, 891 P.2d 712 (Wash. 1995). It
should be noted that, unlike Martin, the state wanted Ms. Schoger to plead guilty. Thus, the
Court stymied both the state's and the defendant's objectives by refusing the plea.
Like Washington, defendants in Virginia also have a right to plead guilty. The Virginia
Constitution at Art. I, 9 8 states in pertinent part: ''In criminal cases, the accused may plead
guilty." This language, the Virginia Court found, "states in clear and unambiguous terms that a
criminal defendant may plead guilty." Finding no further limitation on the right to plead guilty in
either the state statutes or court rules, the Virginia Court held that a criminal defendant has a
right to plead guilty subject only to a determination that the waivers embodied in the plea are
intelligently, knowingly and voluntarily made. Graham v. Commonwealth, supra.
Montana's Supreme Court found that state statutes confer a right to plead guilty on
criminal defendants in State v. Peplow, supra. Section 46-12-204(1), Montana Code (1997)
states in relevant part, "A defendant may plead guilty or not guilty." And, M.C. 5 46-16-105
(1977) states that "[blefore or during trial, a plea of guilty may be accepted." The Peplow court
stated that a general principle of statutory construction provides that when the word "may" is
used to confer power upon an "officer, court, or tribunal, and the public or a third person has an
interest in the exercise of power, then the exercise of the power becomes imperative." Peplow,
36 P.3d at 931, citing, Lamb v. Missoula Imports, Inc. 748 P.2d 965, 968 (Mont. 1988). Based

upon this statutory language, Peplow holds that a court is mandated to accept a defendant's guilty
plea, as long as the statutory requirements of voluntariness, intelligence, and factual basis for the
plea are i'ulfilled. ("There is no limitation imposed upon a defendant's right to plead.
Presumably, had the Legislature intended to require the consent of the court or State as a
condition to a plea of guilty, it would have so stated.").
The Ninth Circuit has most recently addressed the question of whether a defendant has a
right to plead guilty in I n re Vasquez-Ramzvez,supra. In Vasquez-Ramzvez, a federal district
court reEused the guilty plea of Vasquez-Ramierz because the court was concerned about the
sentencing consequences of the plea. Looking at Fed.R.Crim.P. 11, the Ninth Circuit concluded
that while Rule 1l(c) explicitly gives judges the discretion to reject certain kinds of plea
agreements, Rule 1l(a) does not grant any discretion to reject unconditional guilty pleas.
Consequently, a court must accept an unconditional plea so long as the Rule 1l(b) requirements
are met.'
In Idaho, the acceptance of pleas is governed by Criminal Rule 11. Rule 11 states in
relevant part:
(a) Alternatives
(1) In General. A defendant may plead guilty or not guilty. If a defendant refuses
to plead or if a defendant corporation fails to appear, the court shall direct the
entry of a plea of not guilty.

(2) Conditional pleas. With the approval of the court and the consent of the
prosecuting attorney, a defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty reserving

' Federal Rule 1l(a)(l) provides: "A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, or (with the
court's consent) no10 contendere." In contrast, Idaho's Rule I l(a)(l) provides: A defendant may
plead guilty or not guilty." It does not make any provision for requiring court approval for any
sort of unconditional plea, Alford, nolo contendere, or otherwise.

in writing the right, on appeal from the judgment, to review any specified adverse
ruling. . . .
...

Idaho criminal Rule 11
The Rule goes on to set out the rules for acceptance of a plea of guilty in 1l ( c). Those
rules include that the plea is voluntary, that the defendant was properly informed of the
consequences of the plea, that the defendant was advised as to the rights waived by the plea, that
the defendant was informed of the nature of the charge and matters regarding plea bargaining
agreements. Nowhere does the rule provide discretion for a court to reject a guilty plea other
than a conditional plea.
The language of Idaho's rule is identical to or analogous to the language that other states
and the Ninth Circuit have found creates a right to plead guilty. Washington's rule states that a
defendant may plead guilty. Washington CrR 4.2(a). Virginia's constitution provides that a
defendant may plead guilty. Virginia Constitution, Art. I, 5 8. Montana's statute states that a
defendant may plead guilty. Section 46-12-204(1), MCA (1997). And, Federal Criminal Rule 11
provides that a defendant may plead guilty. Just as those authorities have been found to confer a
right to plead guilty, so should Idaho's Rule 11 which states that a defendant may be held to
confer a right to plead guilty.
Such a result would be in accord not only with the reasoning of these other state courts
and the Ninth Circuit, hut also with the rules of statutory construction as previously applied in
Idaho.
Just as in Montana, in Idaho the rules of statutory construction provide that the word

"may" in a statute or rule is to be construed as mandatory when the public interest or individual
rights so require. Dana, Larson, Roubal and Associates v.Board of Commissioners, 124 Idaho
794, 801, 864 P.2d 632,639 (1993), citing Malone v. Van Etten, 67 Idaho 294,301, 178 P.2d
382,385 (1947) and Shea v. Owyhee County, 66 Idaho 159, 156 P.2d 331 (1945).
Moreover, Rule 11 does specifically give the district court the power to reject certain
types of pleas, namely conditional pleas which are to be accepted with approval of the court. By
creating this specific exception to the right of a defendant to plead guilty, the rule necessarily
requires that in other cases the defendant does have the right to plead guilty. This is in accord
with the well-established rule of statutory construction that inclusio unius est exclusio alterius
(the inclusion of one thing is the exclusion of another). Koon v. Bottolfsen 66 Idaho 771,775,
169 P.2d 345, 346 (1946) (applying the maxim in the context of statutovy construction);

Intermountain Gas Co. v.Industrial indem. Co. ofldaho, 125 Idaho 182, 186, 868 P.2d 510, 514
(Ct. App. 1994).

In addition, the public interest is served by finding a right to plead guilty as established in
Rule 11. This case is an excellent example of this public interest. In this case, Ms. Schoger's
attempts to plead guilty were rejected by the District Court in part because the District Court
believed that it was thereby protecting her constitutional rights. The Court specifically noted that
it did not want Ms. Schoger to waive her right to appeal the loss of her suppression motion. In
"protecting" Ms. Schoger's rights, the Court, however well intentioned, sent Ms. Schoger, just as
predicted by trial counsel, right into a conviction on a charge carrying a much higher mandatory
minimum sentence. Ms. Schoger is the person who will be serving 10 years instead of five and
paying $25,000 instead of $15,000, not the District Judge. She is the person who should have

made the decision whether she wanted to pursue an appeal on the suppression motion at the risk
of five additional years of prison. It is not in any way in the public interest to set up a system
whereby district court judges and not defendants determine whether and when to avoid risk of
greater punishment by entering voluntary and constitutionally valid guilty pleas.
Idaho, there is a right to plead guilty, as established in Criminal Rule 11. Given this
right, the District Court had no authority to reject Ms. Schoger's guilty plea.' Therefore,
summary dismissal of her petition for post-conviction relief on the claim that the District Court
abused its discretion was error.
C. Summarv Dismissal Was Inappropriate Because There Were Issues of
Disputed Material Fact as to the Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel

Claim.
1. Introduction

In the event the Court finds that the guilty plea issue could have been raised on direct
appeal and is therefore deemed to be forfeited in post-conviction proceedings, see I.C. 194901(b), Ms. Schoger was deprived of the effective assistance of appellate counsel.
Idaho Code 5 19-852 gives a criminal defendant the right to be represented on any
appeal. This right guarantees the right to effective assistance of counsel. Hernandez v. State,
127 Idaho 685,687,905 P.2d 86,88 (1995). Further, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment requires states to ensure that an indigent appellant receive effective assistance of
counsel on his first appeal of right from a judgment of conviction. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387,

'

It should be noted that Ms. Schoger is not arguing that the District Court could not have
rejected an AEford plea had there not been a factual basis for the plea. However, where, as in this
case, there clearly is a factual basis for the plea, as agreed to by both the defense and the
prosecution, there is no discretion to refuse the plea.
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396 (1985); Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 765, 760 P.2d 1174, 1181 (1988). The Strickland
standard generally applies to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal. See Roe v.
Floves-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470,476-77 (2000).

As detailed below, it was objectively unreasonable for appellate counsel to fail to
challenge the court's rejection of the guilty plea, which was the best claim on appeal. Ms.
Schoger was prejudiced by the deficient perfoimance because she would have only been
sentenced to a lesser fine and fixed tenn of imprisonment.
2. It Was Deficient Performance for Appellate Counsel to Fail to Challenge the
Trial Court's Improper Rejection of the Guilty Plea.

To show deficient performance, a petitioner must demonstrate that counsel's
representation did not meet objective standards of competence. Hayes v. State, 143 Idaho 88, 92,
137 P.3d 475,479 (Ct. App. 2006); Bagshaw v. State, 142 Idaho 34,39, 121 P.3d 965,969 (Ct.
App. 2005). A defendant is entitled lo the reasonably competent assistance of a diligent,
conscientious advocate. Huckv State, 124 Idaho 155, 157, 857 P.2d 634,636 (Ct. App. 1993);
State v. Tuckcer, 97 Idaho 4, 8, 539 P.2d 556, 560 (1975).

Appellate counsel is required to make a conscientious examination of the case and file a
brief in support of the best arguments to be made. Jakoski v. State, 136 Idaho 280, 285,32 P.3d
672, 677 (Ct. App. 2001); LaBelle v State, 130 Idaho 115, 119,937 P.2d 427,431 (Ct. App.
1997). While, as a general matter, courts will not attempt to second-guess counsel's strategic and
tactical choices, see State v. Elison, 135 Idaho 546,551,21 P.3d 483,488 (2001), this rule does
not apply to counsel's decisions that are the result of inadequate preparation, ignorance of the
relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation. Id. A post-conviction

applicant can overcome the presumption of effective assistance by showing that the ignored
issues are clearly stronger than those presented. See Smith v. Rohhins, 528 U.S. 259,288 (2000);
Mintun v. State, 144 Idaho 656,661, 168 P.3d 40,45 (Ct. App. 2007), rev. denied September 14,
2007.
Appellate counsel's performance was deficient under Strickland because he failed to raise
the best issue available on appeal. As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has written:
Where appellate counsel abandons a claim that was preserved below it is
appropriate to inquire into the reason for that decision. While we recognize that
counsel is not obligated to present on direct appeal every issue raised at trial,
when a contention which is not patently frivolous is abandoned, the decision to do
so must be justified by some reasonable basis intended to inure to the client's
benefit.
Commonwealth v. Yocham, 375 A.2d 325,328 (Pa. 1977); see also Commonwealth v. Townsell,
379 A.2d 98 (Pa. 1977) (although strategy of appellate counsel may warrant deliberate choice as
to the manner, emphasis, and length of argument, complete disregard of an important issue
cannot be ignored as a matter of strategy).
The omission of the rejected plea issue was deficient performance. The issue was
preserved for appeal and there is no conceivable strategic reason for appellate counsel to fail to
raise the issue. And, what is most important, the issue was meritorious while the sentencing
issue which was actually raised on appeal was frivolous considering the ten-year fixed term was
the lowest possible sentence which could be imposed after trial. Therefore, appellate counsel's
failure to raise the best issue on appeal demonstrates that appellate counsel was neither diligent
nor conscientious. There was simply no reason to fail to raise the issue with the best chance of
success. In light of the above, there is at least a material issue offact as to whether appellate

counsel's conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and summary disposition
was inappropriate.
3. The Failure to Raise the Rejected Plea Issue Prejudiced Ms. Schoger.

Further, it appears that Ms. Schoger is entitled to relief on this claim because she was
prejudiced by appellate counsel's deficient performance. To meet the prejudice element, a
defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional
errors, the results of the proceeding would have been different. Hayes v. State, 143 Idaho 88,92,
137 P.3d 475,479 (Ct. App. 2006); Bagshaw v. State, 142 Idaho 34,39, 121 P.3d 965,969 (Ct.
App. 2005).

In this case, as explained above, this Court would have vacated the conviction and

remanded the case for entry of a guilty plea to the reduced charge because the trial court had no
authority to reject the voluntary, knowing and intelligently made plea to the reduced charge.
And, the District Court would have imposed a lesser sentence upon remand.
Thus, there is at least a material question of h c t as to whether Ms. Schoger was
prejudiced by appellate counsel's failure to raise the issue on appeal and the petition should not
have been summarily dismissed.

V. CONCLUSION

In light of the above, Ms. Schoger respectfully asks that this Court reverse the district
court's order summarily dismissing her petition for post-conviction relief and remand for further
proceedings.
Respectfully submitted this

day of January, 2008.
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